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Abstract: 
This paper studies budget processes, both theoretically and experimentally. We give a 
sufficient condition for top-down and bottom-up budget processes to have the same voting 
equilibrium. Furthermore, at a voting equilibrium, it is not always true, as often presumed, 
that a top-down budget process leads to a smaller overall budget than does a bottom-up 
budget process. To test the implications for budget processes of voting equilibrium theory, we 
conduct a series of 128 voting experiments using subjects in a behavior laboratory. The 
experimental evidence from these experiments is well organized by voting equilibrium theory, 
both at the aggregate level and at the individual subject level. In particular, subjects display 
considerable evidence of rationality in their proposals and votes. More complete information 
and fewer spending categories lead to greater predictive success of voting equilibrium theory, 
and reduce the time needed to reach a budget decision. 
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1. Introduction 
 
A budget process is a system of rules governing the decision making that leads to a 
budget, from its formulation, through its legislative approval, to its execution. Consider the 
budget process of the United States government. The President formulates a budget proposal 
as part of his annual obligation to report on the State of the Union. Each house of Congress 
then reworks the budget proposal, with a final budget being passed by both houses for 
presidential approval.  
In the last quarter century, the details olkf the budget process, both in the United 
States and in other countries, have been the object of considerable research (Wildavsky, 1975; 
Ferejohn and Krehbiel, 1987; Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1999; von Hagen and Harden, 1995, 
1996; see also the contributions in Poterba and von Hagen, 1999). There is a growing body of 
empirical research, based on international comparative studies, suggesting that the design of 
budget processes has considerable influence on the fiscal performance of governments. This 
has also been reflected in political decisions. In the United States, the Budget Act of 1974, the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act of 1985, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1991 all tried to 
reduce excessive government spending and deficits by changes in the budget process. In the 
European Union, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union of 1992 mandates reform of 
budget processes of the member states to enhance fiscal discipline.  
One aspect of the budget process that has received considerable attention is the 
sequence of budgeting decisions. Traditionally, Congress votes on budget items line-by-line, 
or category-by-category. The sum of all spending approved by Congress emerged as the 
overall budget—a budget process called bottom-up. The budget reforms stemming from the 
Budget Act of 1974 replaced this tradition with a different sequence. First, Congress was to 
vote on the total size of the budget. Once that was determined, Congress would allocate that 
total budget among spending categories. A budget process of that type is called a top-down 
process. It was argued at the time, that a top-down budget process would lead to a better 
outcome, in particular, to a smaller budget, than would a bottom-up budget process 
(Committee on the Budget, 1987).  
A similar presumption is shared by many international organizations, which act as if a 
top-down budget process is inherently preferable to a bottom-up process. The Organization of 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1987) reported approvingly that several 
countries adopted top-down budget processes in quest of greater fiscal discipline. Schick 
(1986) analyzes this report, explaining (and supporting) the thinking behind it in great detail. 
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The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expresses a similar preference for top-down 
processes (IMF, 1996). 
The presumption in favor of top-down budgeting stands in stark contrast to voting 
equilibrium theory. Suppose rational agents participate as voters in a budget process. In 
particular, if voters are sophisticated in the sense of Farquharson (1969) and Kramer (1972): 
they consider the implications of voting in early stages of the budget process for later stages 
of the process. Furthermore, assume that voters have convex preferences over the individual 
dimensions of the budget, and that the budget process divides the decision-making process 
into a sequence of one-dimensional decisions. Based on these assumptions, Ferejohn and 
Krehbiel (1987) show that the voting equilibrium of a top-down budget process generally 
differs from the equilibrium of a bottom-up process: sequence matters. However, there is no 
unambiguous relation between sequence and the size of the budget. Depending on the voters’ 
preferences, a top-down process can lead to larger or smaller budgets. 
This argument, based on voting equilibrium, depends crucially on the rationality of 
voters—itself an empirical issue. One way to get at this empirical issue is with controlled 
laboratory experiments. While laboratory experiments create artificial environments, they 
have the advantage over international comparisons that the design of an institution and the 
setting of a decision-making process can be controlled much more precisely. Previous 
experiments have found some evidence for sophisticated voting in two stage voting games 
(Holt and Eckel, 1989; Davis and Holt,1993). Similarly, in a pilot experiment Gardner and 
von Hagen (1997) find that structurally induced voting equilibrium best accounts for the data 
from their experimental trials of bottom-up and top-down budget processes. 
This paper reports on a series of 128 independent trials of voting over budgets. The 
first testable implication of the theory of structurally induced voting equilibrium is that the 
outcome of a budget process depends on the voters’ preferences and on structure of the 
process. Therefore, we vary voters’ preferences and the structure of the process (bottom-up or 
top-down) in a systematic way over these 128 trials. The second testable implication of the 
theory concerns the effect dimensionality⎯the number of spending categories⎯has on the 
budget process and its outcome. Whereas previous experiments have been confined to two 
dimensions, ours include treatments with two and four dimensions. This leads to a gain in 
applicability, since naturally occurring budget processes only rarely deal with two 
dimensions. A third testable implication of the theory concerns the effect of incomplete 
information on the budget process and its outcome. Whereas previous experiments have 
assumed complete information (each voter knows the preferences of all voters), ours include 
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treatments with complete and incomplete information. In the incomplete information 
treatment, a voter knows only his or her own preferences, and not the preferences of any other 
voter. This extension is again made in the interest of realism. Many budgets are processed in 
situations where a voter has limited knowledge of the preferences of other voters.  
Our main result is that institutions matter. The data from all treatments correspond 
closely to the theory of voting equilibrium, and institutions drive those equilibria. The 
subjects display a high degree of sophistication over all treatments. Both extra dimensionality 
and incomplete information increase the complexity of the decision problem subjects face, 
and increase the number of periods needed to reach a final decision.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section sets out the general model, as well 
as the specification we have implemented experimentally. Section 3 describes the 
experimental design, as carried out at the economics behavior laboratory of the University of 
Karlsruhe. Our aggregate results are presented in section 4; individual results, in section 5. 
Section 6 concludes with the policy implications of these experiments. 
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2. A model of budgeting 
 
We present a model of budgeting which is an extension to many dimensions of the 
model of Ferejohn and Krehbiel (1987). To solve this model, we use the notion of structurally 
induced equilibria following McKelvy (1979). 
 
2.1 The general model 
 
There are n voters, indexed by i, i=1,..., n. Using majority rule, the voters decide on 
the size and allocation of a budget. There are m spending categories in the overall budget. Let 
Rm+ denote the non-negative orthant of m-dimensional Euclidean space, the space of all 
possible budget vectors. Let the vector x = (x1, ..., xn) ∈ Rm+ denote a possible budget, where 
xj represents spending in the budget category j. The total spending implied by the budget 
vector x is  
 
B =  x j
j=1
m∑ .  
 
Each voter i has preferences over budgets x represented by his or her utility function 
ui(x). We assume that each voter i has an ideal budget (or an ideal point) x*(i). The closer the 
actual budget is to a player’s ideal budget the higher is the player’s utility, where closeness is 
measured by the Euclidean distance function. This implies  
 
ui ( ) [ ( )]
*x = − −
=
∑K x xi j j
j
m
2
1
i
                                                
,  
 
where Ki is the utility attached to the ideal point.1 In general, each voter i has an ideal point 
x*(i) distinct from that of all other voters.  
 Several interpretations of players and their ideal points are possible. For instance, the 
players may be spending ministers in a coalition government. In this case, an ideal point 
represents the overall spending budget a spending minister would like to see enacted. Again, 
 
1 In the two dimensional case the Euclidean utility function leads to circular indifference curves. More 
general preferences are studied experimentally in Lao-Araya (1998), whose results suggest that voting 
equilibrium theory is robust with regard to elleptical indifference curves. 
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suppose the player is a member of a legislature. Then the ideal point may represent a 
commitment made by that legislator during his or her successful election campaign, to see 
that the ideal point (or something as close to it as possible ) is enacted into legislation. 
Assume that decisions are made by majority rule, applied in a pairwise fashion over 
two budget proposals x and y. If  the number of those voting for x is greater than the number 
of those voting for y, x defeats y. A budget x is a voting equilibrium, or a Condorcet 
equilibrium, if it defeats all other budgets. Note that for n ≥ 3 and m ≥ 2, the paradox of 
voting—non-existence of a Condorcet equilibrium—can occur ( Riker 1962). 
To address the problem posed by the nonexistence of voting equilibrium in many 
dimensions, various institutions have evolved, which use majority rule for a single dimension 
at a time. With Euclidean preferences, there exists a voting equilibrium in each dimension, 
identified with the median voter in that dimension. With m budget categories, at most m such 
decisions are required, one for each spending category. The structure of a budget process 
induces a voting equilibrium. The voting equilibrium so induced depends on the process. 
With an odd number of voters, each with a unique ideal point, the voting equilibrium is 
unique. 
In a bottom-up budget process the sequence of votes is taken in each dimension at a 
time. For instance, if there are two dimensions the vote is taken first on one dimension and 
then on the other. With Euclidean preferences in two dimensions, the voting equilibrium is 
invariant under permutations of the sequence of dimensions. One gets the same bottom-up 
equilibrium if the vote on dimension 1 is first, or if the vote on dimension 2 is first. This also 
holds true for higher dimensions, when m ≥ 2. The structurally induced equilibrium is 
constructed from the voting equilibrium in each dimension of the process. Let xbu denote the 
equilibrium induced by a bottom-up budget process. 
In a top-down budget process, the sequence of votes starts with a vote on the total 
budget. Then votes are taken on the distribution of total spending over m-1 spending 
categories. For instance, if there are two dimensions, the vote is taken first on the total budget 
and then on a dimension orthogonal to that one, the dimension corresponding to the difference 
in the two spending categories.2Again, the voting equilibrium is invariant under permutations 
of the sequence of orthogonal dimensions. The structurally induced equilibrium is constructed 
from the the voting equilibrium in each dimension of the voting taken. Let xtd denote the 
equilibrium induced by a top-down budget process. 
                                                 
2 This vote could also be taken over a non-orthogonal dimension, such as dimension 1 or dimension 2, 
without changing the resulting voting equilibrium. 
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In general, xtd does not equal xbu. A sufficient condition for xtd and xbu to be equal is 
that there exist a Condorcet equilibrium xC over the entire space of budgets, in which case xtd 
and xbu equal xC. As already pointed out, this condition is unlikely to be satisfied in practice. 
One way to see this in two dimensions (the same insight holds for higher dimensions) is to 
note that a Condorcet equilibrium must have majority support in every dimension. Consider 
the case of  bottom-up voting first. We seek possible configurations under which a median 
voter is the same in both dimensions⎯hence this median voter's ideal point is the Condorcet 
equilibrium. The simplest such configuration is if all the voters' ideal points are arrayed on a 
straight line (see Figure 1). The first vote is determined by the median of the ideal points 
projected onto the first budget dimension (line a) and the second vote by the median of the 
ideal points projected onto the second dimension (line b). Line a and line b meet at the 
bottom-up equilibrium xbu which is equal to the ideal point x*(2) and therefore equal to the 
desired Condorcet equilibrium xC. 
Next consider the case of top-down voting. The first vote is determined by the median 
of the preferred total budgets. This decision is graphically represented by the median -45° line 
through the ideal points (line c). The second decision, the vote on the first category, is 
graphically represented by the median 45° line through the ideal points (line d). Line c and 
line d also meet at x*(2). Thus, xtd equals xC as well. 
When this sufficient condition is not satisfied, , bottom-up and top-down voting may 
lead to different outcomes. See figures 2 and 3, which illustrate this for the case of n = 5, m = 
2. 
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Figure 1: 
Condorcet equilibrium 
 
2.2 Specific models 
 
For all experiments studied here, the number of voters, n, equals 5. The number of 
spending categories, m, equals either 2 or 4. To specify the voters' utility functions, we have 
two designs⎯one design is such that the voting equilibrium of a top-down budget process 
leads to a larger budget than the voting equilibrium of a bottom-up budget process, and vice 
versa in the other design. 
We discuss first the simpler case m = 2. To specify the voters' utility functions, we 
have two designs, design I and design II. They are presented in Table 1. Notice that the two 
designs differ by voter 4’s ideal point only. Voters 1, 2, 3, and 5 have the same ideal points in 
both designs. The general intention behind these two designs is to make the difference 
between the equilibrium induced by a bottom-up process, xtd , and the equilibrium induced by 
a top-down process, xbu, large and in different directions. As can be seen in Table 2, in design 
I, the total budget corresponding to xbu is smaller than the total budget corresponding to xtd , 
while the opposite is true in design II. 
For design I, the median of the dimension 1 components of the ideal points is 8. The 
median of the dimension 2 components of ideal points is 13. Putting the components from the 
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two dimensions together, we get (8, 13). The solution induced by the bottom-up process is the 
vector (8, 13). This is xbu. The total spending under this budget is 21.  
The solution induced by the top-down process is the vector (10, 13). This is xtd. The 
total spending under this budget is 23. To find the top-down solution, start with two 
orthogonal dimensions, corresponding to the x1+x2 dimension and the x1-x2 dimension. In the 
x1+x2 dimension, the sum of ideal points components of the five players is 19, 16, 24, 23, and 
25, respectively. The median of these components is 23. In the x1-x2 dimension, the  
difference of ideal points components of the five players is -7, -2, -8, -1, -3, respectively. The 
median of these components is -3. Solving the pair of equations x1+x2 = 23 and x1-x2= -3 
yields x1 = 10, x2 = 13. 
 The ideal points and the voting equilibria of design I are shown in Figure 2. 
Graphically, the bottom-up equilibrium xbu = (8,13) is determined by the intersection of the 
vertical median line through the ideal points a and the horizontal median line b. The top-down 
equilibrium xtd = (10,13) is determined by the intersection of the -45° median line c and the 
45° median line d. Notice that xtd is different from xbu. Bottom-up voting leads to a smaller 
budget, 21, than does top-down voting, 23. 
 For design II, the solution xbu induced by the bottom-up process is the vector (8, 13). 
The total spending under this budget is 21. This is the same as in design I. However, for the 
top down process, the solution xtd is the vector (8, 11). The total spending under this budget is 
19. Notice that xtd is different from xbu, but in contrast to design I, top-down voting leads to a 
smaller budget, 19, than does bottom-down voting, 21 (see Figure 3). This is because the 
median voter, here voter 4, goes from wanting to spend 23 units in design I to 18 units in 
design II. 
We consider now the case m = 4. The basic principle in getting from two dimensions 
to four dimensions is projection: (x1, x2) maps into (x1, x2, x1, x2). The ideal points of each 
player are presented in Table 1. The medians of the ideal points in each dimension are 
preserved under projection.  
For design III, which is the projection of design I, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 
are 8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four dimensions together, 
we get xbu , the vector (8, 13, 8, 13). The total spending under this budget is 42.  
The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the vector (10, 13, 10, 13); this 
again follows by projection. The total spending under this budget is 46. Notice that xtd is 
different from xbu, and in particular that xtd spends more than xbu, 46 versus 42. 
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 For design IV, which is the projection of design II, the medians in dimensions 1 and 3 
of the ideal points are 8; in dimensions 2 and 4, 13. Putting the components from the four 
dimensions together, we get (8, 13, 8, 13) as the bottom-up vector xbu . Total spending under 
this budget is 42. 
The solution xtd induced by the top-down process is the (8, 11, 8, 11). The total 
spending under this budget is 38. Notice that xtd also differs from xbu. In contrast to design III, 
top-down voting leads to a smaller budget, 38, than the budget of size 42 that bottom-up 
voting adopts. 
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Table 1: 
Individual ideal points and utility function, x*(i) and ui(x) 
 
  
m = 2  
 
m = 4 
 Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
Voter i  x1*(i) x2*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x3*(i) x4*(i) x1*(i) x2*(i) x3*(i) x4*(i)
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
11 
11 
13 
9 
16 
12 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
6 
7 
8 
9 
11 
13 
9 
16 
9 
14 
Utility 
Function 
Of voter i 
ui(x) 
 
15 2
1
2
− −
=
∑ [ (*x x ij j
j
)]  
 
 
30 2
1
4
− −
=
∑ [ (*x x ij j
j
)]  
 
 
 
Table 2: 
Voting equilibria 
 
  
m = 2  
 
m = 4 
 Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
Process x1 x2 x1 x2 x1 x2 x3 x4 x1 x2 x3 x4
Bottom-up 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 8 13 
Σ 21 21 42 42 
Top-down 10 13 8 11 10 13 10 13 8 11 8 11 
Σ 23 19 46 38 
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Figure 2: 
Voting equilibria (design I) 
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Figure 3: 
Voting equilibria (design II) 
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3. Experimental design 
 
The instructions for the experiment are based on those of the classic voting experiment 
conducted by Plott and Krehbiel (1979). Copies of the instructions (in German) are available 
from the authors upon request. 
In the experiment, subjects are told that each of them is member of a group of 5 
subjects. In designs I and II, the group's task is to decide on how many integer-valued tokens 
to spend on two activities, called A and B. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, 
subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activity 
A. Their decision on this number is final. They then have to decide on the number of tokens 
to be spent on activity B, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for 
a top-down budget process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of 
tokens to be spent on activities A and B together. Their decision on this number is final. They 
then have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activity A, at which point they 
have completed their task. 
In designs III and IV, the group's task is to decide on how many tokens to spend on 
four activities, called A, B, C, and D. In the instructions for a bottom-up budget process, 
subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent for activity 
A. Their decision on this number is final. They then repeat this process for activities B, C, and 
D in that order, at which point they have completed their task. In the instructions for a top-
down budget process, subjects are told that they first have to decide on the number of tokens 
to be spent on activities A, B, C, and D together. Their decision on this number is final. They 
then have to decide on the number of tokens to be spent on activities, A, B, and C in that 
order, at which point they have completed their task. 
At each step, the decision task is to decide on a number of tokens to be spent on some 
category or combination of categories. The decision process starts with a proposal on the 
floor which equals zero. At any point in time, each subject has the right to propose an 
amendment. If an amendment is proposed, then the group has to vote on it. If the proposed 
amendment is accepted, then it becomes the new proposal on the floor. If the proposed 
amendment is rejected, it has no effect; the proposal on the floor remains unchanged. In that 
case, each subject is free to propose another amendments, but only one amendment, at a time. 
At any point of time, a subject may also propose to end the process. If this proposal is 
accepted, then the proposal on the floor is considered accepted. If the proposal to end 
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deliberations is rejected, then new amendments may be proposed or new proposals for ending 
the process may be made. 
All votes are based on simple majority rule. This implies that if three or more 
members of the group vote in favor of the proposal, then it wins. Otherwise the proposal is 
rejected. 
In the beginning of the experiment, each subject is informed about his personal payoff 
(or utility) function. The instructions give each subject the exact formula for the payoff 
function, which is also explained to him. In the case of two spending categories (design I and 
design II), the subject is given a table which shows his or her payoff for each combination of 
numbers in the two spending categories. In all four designs, each subject can, in the final 
dimension of voting, call up on his or her computer screen to see individual payoff for  the 
proposal on the table and the proposed amendment.  
Besides designs I through IV, which differ with respect to the number of spending 
categories and the ideal points, we distinguish between two informational treatments. In the 
complete information treatment each subject knows not only his own ideal point, but also the 
ideal points of the four other players in his group. In the incomplete information treatment, 
each player is only informed about his own ideal point. 
The experiments were organized at the University of Karlsruhe. Subjects were 
students from various disciplines. The experiments were computerized. Each subject was 
seated at a computer terminal which was isolated from other subjects' terminals by wooden 
screens. The subjects received written instructions which were also read aloud by a research 
assistant. Before an experiment started, each subject had to answer at his computer terminal a 
short questionnaire (10 questions) concerning the instructions. Only after all subjects had 
given the right answers to all questions did decision-making begin. No communication other 
than through the recognition of proposals and the announcement of the outcomes of votes was 
permitted.  
We organized sessions with 15 or more subjects. Thus, no subject could identify with 
which of the other participants he or she was grouped. Each subject participated in exactly 
one experiment; thus, each group of 5 subjects yielded an independent observation. For each 
design (4), each budget process (2), and each information condition (2), we obtained 8 
independent observations, for a total of  128 experiments. Table 3 gives an overview of the 
experimental design. In obtaining these 128 independent observations, we also acquired data 
on 640 subjects, 5 each per experiment. 
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Table 3: 
Treatment design 
 
  Number of groups (subjects) 
  M = 2 m = 4 
  Design I Design II Design III Design IV 
Complete 
information 
Bottom-up 
Top-down 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
Incomplete 
information 
Bottom-up 
Top-down 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
8 (40) 
 
 
 
4. Experimental results 
 
This section considers aggregate data from the experiment; the next section, individual 
data. Start with the sizes of the overall budgets we observe in these 128 experiments. Tables 4 
(for the 2-dimensional treatment) and 5 (for the four-dimensional treatment) give an overview 
of observed group voting outcomes in all treatments. In situations where top-down voting 
equilibria spend more than bottom-up voting equilibria (designs I and III), we observe this 
very clearly in the data. The same holds true in situations where top-down voting equilibria 
spend less than bottom-up voting equilibria (designs II and IV). With complete information, 
the differences between bottom-up and top-down total budgets are significant at the 10% level 
in design I, and at the 5 percent level in designs II, III and IV (Mann-Whitney U-test). With 
incomplete information, the corresponding differences are significant at the 10 percent level 
in design II, and at the 5 percent level in designs III and IV. In design I the difference is not 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level; but it does go in the right direction.3
 
Result 1: Sequence matters. The outcomes observed under bottom-up and top-down voting 
differ from each other significantly.  
 
                                                 
3 A single large outlier is responsible for this lack of statistical significance. 
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We next show that voting equilibrium is a good predictor. To see this visually, first 
pool the data from designs I and II, and call the pooled data the 2-dimensional treatment. 
Figure 4 show the scatter diagram of 2-dimensional treatment data relative to the predicted 
value. Notice how tight the scatter is around the voting equilibrium prediction; the average 
Euclidean distance of an observation from the predicted value is 1.5, a small number relative 
to a predicted total sum of between 19 and 23. A similar picture emerges for the 4-
dimensional treatment, where the average Euclidean distance of an observation from the 
predicted value is 2.6, again a small number relative to a predicted total sum of between 38 
and 46. Pooling over all 128 observations, the average Euclidean distance of the observed 
budgets from voting equilibrium is 2.1. 
 
Result 2. Voting equilibrium is a good predictor of budget outcome. The average distance of 
observed outcomes from predicted equilibrium is 2.1, a small number. 
 
Table 4: 
Average budgets in the two-dimensional treatments 
 
 Design I Design II 
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down 
Complete 
Incomplete 
21.4 
22.6 
22.5 
22.6 
21.4 
21.5 
19.0 
20.1 
Voting equilibrium 21 23 21 19 
 
 
Table 5: 
Average budgets in the four-dimensional treatments 
 
 Design III Design IV 
Information Bottom-up Top-down Bottom-up Top-down 
Complete 
Incomplete 
42.1 
43.4 
46.4 
46.6 
43.0 
43.8 
38.0 
38.6 
Voting equilibrium 42 46 42 38 
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Next, introduce another measure of closeness of an observed budget to a predicted 
equilibrium: an observation is close to predicted equilibrium if it does not deviate from it by 
more than one unit in any spending category. Over all treatments, 53.9% are close (10 out of 
128 outcomes, or 7.8%, hit the predicted equilibrium exactly). 
Table 6 reports the percentages of observations close to the voting equilibrium 
prediction for all information-dimensionality treatments. First, we see that with complete 
information, a higher percentage of outcomes is equal or close to the voting equilibrium than 
under incomplete information. This is true for each dimensional treatment separately, as well 
as on average, the respective averages being 62.5% versus 45.3%. Second, we see that with 
lower dimensionality, a higher percentage of outcomes is equal or close to the voting 
equilibrium than with higher dimensionality. This is true for each information treatment 
separately, as well as on average, the respective averages being 67.2% versus 40.6%.  
 
Result 3. Institutions matter: more than half (53.9%) of all observed budgets are close to the 
predicted voting equilibrium. 
Figure 4: 
Distribution of outcomes around equilibrium 
 
It is mathematically easier to realize an outcome which is equal or close to the voting 
equilibrium in two dimensions than in four dimensions. To address this concern, we apply to 
the data in Table 6 Selten's (1991) measure of predictive success, which adjusts for 
dimensionality in the following way. Define the hit rate as the frequency of outcomes close to 
the voting equilibrium; define the area rate as the area of all points near the voting 
equilibrium, relative to the set of reasonable outcomes—outcomes any reasonable theory 
might allow for. Selten’s measure then is the difference between the hit rate and the area rate. 
In particular, the area rate in two dimensions is greater than the area rate in four dimensions.  
To see this, consider the set of natural numbers bounded in each direction by the 
minimum and the maximum values of subjects’ ideal points. Call this the set of reasonable 
outcomes—it contains the set of Pareto optima, and also includes outcomes which are nearly 
Pareto optima. In designs I and II (dimension 2), the set of reasonable outcomes is the 
rectangle defined by the corners (6,9), (6,16), (11,9), (11,16), and contains 48 points. The area 
close to the voting equilibrium covers 9 points, so the area rate is 9/48 or 19 percent.  
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In designs III and IV (dimension 4), the set of reasonable outcomes is the polyhedron 
defined by the points (6,9,6,9), (6,16,6,16), (11,16,11,16), and (11,9,11,9), and contains 2304 
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points. The area equal or close to the voting equilibrium covers 81 points, so the area rate is 
81/2304 or 3%. This verifies mathematically that it is harder to get close to a voting 
equilibrium in four dimensions where the area rate is 3%, than in two dimensions, where the 
area rate is 19%. 
 
Table 6: 
Percentage of budgets close to the voting equilibrium budget 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average 
Complete  78.1 46.9 62.5 
Incomplete  56.3 34.4 45.3 
Average 67.2 40.6 53.8 
 
Given these area rates, we can compute the measures of predictive success for the 
dimensionality treatment; Table 7 shows the results. In two dimensions, the hit rate is 67.2% 
and the area rate is 19%, yielding a predictive success of 48.2%. In four dimensions, the hit 
rate is 40.6% and the area rate is 3%, yielding a predictive success of 37.6%. Although 
predictive success is still greater in two dimensions than in four, the difference is much 
reduced. To put these levels of predictive success in context, note that the predictive success 
of Nash equilibrium theory is often less than 5% (Keser and Gardner, 1999). 
 
Result 4 The predictive success of voting equilibrium theory is 43%. Predictive success 
increases with complete information, and with fewer spending categories. 
 
Table 7: 
Predictive Success of Voting Equilibria 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional Average 
Complete  59.1 43.9 51.5 
Incomplete  37.3 31.4 34.4 
Average 48.2 37.6 43.0 
 
Table 8 shows the average number of moves—a proposal followed by a vote—needed 
to reach a budget decision in the information-dimensionality treatments. To reach a budget 
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decision takes about 30 percent more moves with incomplete information, as opposed to 
complete information. To reach a budget decision in four dimensions takes about twice as 
many moves as in two dimensions. Since the 4-dimensional case requires twice as many final 
decisions made as the 2-dimensional case, we conclude that, relative to the number of 
spending categories the same effort is needed to reach a budget decision in both cases. 
 
Result 5: The number of moves needed to reach a budget decision is greater with incomplete 
information than with complete information. The number of moves needed to reach a budget 
decision increases proportionally with the number of spending categories.  
 
Table 8: 
Average number of moves to reach the budget decision 
 
Information Two-dimensional Four-dimensional 
Complete  
Incomplete  
11.0 
14.5 
22.6 
28.8 
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5.  Individual behavior 
 
Now turn to data on individual behavior. We consider first the effect of the 
information treatment on individual proposals. In two dimensions with incomplete 
information, subjects propose their ideal points 55.9% of the time; with complete information, 
42.5%. This difference is significant at the 1 percent level (χ2 - test). In four dimensions with 
incomplete information, subjects propose their ideal points 47.8% of the time; with complete 
information,  40.8%. This difference is significant at the 5 percent level (χ2 - test). 
 
Result 6: With incomplete information, subjects propose their individual ideal points 
significantly more often than with complete information. 
 
This makes sense. If subjects’ information is incomplete, then proposing one’s ideal point has 
considerable signaling value. Subjects could be exploiting this signaling potential.  
 
Table 9: 
Direction of Proposals, with reference to an individual’s optimal value (OV) .4
 
  Percent of proposals 
Dimensions Information Towards 
equilibrium 
Equal to OV Away from 
equilibrium 
Two Complete  57.3 37.6 5.1 
Two Incomplete 30.8 53.0 16.2 
Four Complete 49.9 41.9 8.2 
Four Incomplete 35.3 46.4 18.3 
 
Table 9 gives the relative frequencies with which proposals made by individuals 
moved towards equilibrium, stayed at an individuals’ optimal value (OV), or moved away 
from equilibrium. With complete information, the most frequently made proposals moved 
towards equilibrium; with incomplete information, the most frequently made proposals stayed 
at an individual’s optimal value. Across all treatments, the least frequently made proposals 
                                                 
4 By value we mean the amount of either the total budget or the respective spending category, 
depending on the decision situation. We exclude from consideration all subjects whose OV coincides with 
equilibrium. 
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moved away from equilibrium. Table 9 clearly reveals that across all treatments, the majority 
of proposals, if they deviate from a subject's respective optimal value, move towards voting 
equilibrium. This is significant at the 5 percent level (sign-test). 
 
Result 7:  Subjects, when not proposing their optimal value, deviate from it in the direction of 
the voting equilibrium. This is true both under complete and incomplete information. 
 
This is an important indicator of the quality of proposals and of the rationality of the subjects. 
Subjects’ proposals drive an equilibrium-seeking process.  
Once an amendment to a proposal has been made, subjects have to vote on it. Table 10 
considers for each individual vote whether the amendment, if adopted, would increase, leave 
unchanged, or decrease the subject's status quo utility, and records the relative frequency of 
votes for acceptance in each case. We see that in all information-dimensionality treatments, a 
majority of individuals vote to support utility-increasing amendments, while a minority of 
individuals vote to support utility-decreasing amendments. This tendency to accept utility-
increasing amendments and to reject utility-decreasing amendments is significant at the 1 
percent level (binomial-test) 
 
 Result 8:  Subjects’ voting behavior with respect to amendments on the floor is sequentially 
rational. They accept amendments if they increase their status quo utility, and reject 
amendments if they decrease their status quo utility. 
 
This result provides more support for subjects’ rationality, as evidenced through their voting 
behavior. 
Table 11 shows for all information-dimensionality treatments, the percentage of 
proposals that have the values of voting equilibrium, at the amendment stage, as accepted 
proposals, and as final decisions. In each treatment we observe an increase in the frequency of 
voting equilibrium values, from the amendment stage to final decision. Furthermore, across 
all dimension-information treatments, the frequency of voting equilibrium is higher with 
complete information than with incomplete information, and higher in 2 dimensions than in 
four dimensions. This suggests that complexity is again the enemy of voting equilibrium, 
since both incomplete information and more spending categories make the decision task more 
complex.  
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Result 9: The percentage of voting equilibrium values increases from the amendment stage to 
the final decision stage. Complexity in the form of more spending categories or incomplete 
information reduces this percentage.  
 
To conclude, our results support the concept of voting equilibrium also on the level of 
individual behavior, as subjects exhibit considerable rationality in their proposals and votes. 
 
Table 10: 
Percentage of individual votes supporting proposals to increase, leave unchanged, or decrease 
utility 
 
 
  Relative frequency of accepted votes  
if the effect of the amendment relative to the status quo is
Dimensions Information Increase No change Decrease 
Two Complete 69.1 58.2 13.6 
Two Incomplete 69.0 48.6 7.6 
Four Complete  56.2 43.5 27.9 
Four Incomplete 63.9 46.8 24.6 
 
 
Table 11: 
Percentage of proposals that have the values of voting equilibrium 
 
  Percentage of voting equilibrium values in 
Dimensions Information Amendments Accepted 
proposals 
Final decisions 
Two Complete 24.3 35.1 50.0 
Two Incomplete 15.9 25.2 37.5 
Four Complete  20.7 28.6 36.7 
Four Incomplete  16.3 21.5 34.4 
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6. Conclusion 
 
This paper has studied budget processes⎯the system of rules governing decision-
making, leading to a budget⎯both theoretically and experimentally. On the theoretical side, 
we have shown that a top-down budget process does not necessarily lead to a smaller overall 
budget than a bottom-up budget process does. We then conducted a series of 128 experiments 
to study budgeting processes using subjects in a behavior laboratory. The evidence from those 
experiments supported the theory of voting equilibrium, both at the aggregate level and at the 
individual subject level. The subjects in these experiments exhibited behavior of a high 
degree of sophistication, both in the proposals they made and in the votes they cast. Neither 
incomplete information nor high dimensionality of the task prevented them from coming 
close to the predicted voting equilibrium.  
These results have three important policy implications. First and foremost, institutions 
matter. The kind of budget one gets from a budget process is driven by the voting equilibrium 
of that process, and the voting equilibrium depends on the institution being used. If one uses 
an inefficient or irrational institution, one can expect inefficient or irrational outcomes.  
Second, sequence matters. Policy makers should not presume that a top-down budget 
process always leads to less spending. As we have seen, that presumption is tantamount to 
presuming unsophisticated behavior on the part of voters in budget processes. On the 
contrary, we observe highly sophisticated voting behavior in our sample of 640 subjects. 
Indeed, sophisticated voters with big-spender preferences will not be deterred by a top-down 
process from arriving at a big-spending budget.  
Finally, complexity is costly. If we measure decision-making costs in terms of the 
number of votes required to reach closure, those costs go up with more spending categories 
and with less incomplete information. To the extent that decision-making costs are important, 
agenda setters in a budget process, such as finance ministers, are well-advised to keep the 
overall decision low-dimensional, even if this means relying on local autonomy for more 
detailed budget allocations. While incomplete information also increases decision-making 
costs, it does not appear to significantly reduce the predictive success of voting equilibrium 
theory. This increases the real-world applicability of our results, since complete information, 
even in a cabinet or legislature of long standing, is rare. 
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